It is clear by now that the end of the Cold War and the period of relative peace, globalization, and prosperity that ensued after the collapse of the USSR and its satellites was no end of history. Instead, the United States sat briefly alone at the helm of the world order, where it made a series of navigational errors. It diverted scarce resources and political capital into the global war on terror and outsourced its vast industrial base to developing countries and geopolitical rivals alike. Meanwhile, revisionist powers such as Russia and China collected themselves enough to challenge the status quo. This has proved to be the death knell of the rules-based international order, which, in hindsight, seems to have been little more than a coy euphemism for the liberal, corporatized American empire.
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Brendan Simms, a professor of the history of international relations at the University of Cambridge, is not the first to take note of this. But his interpretation of today’s world order, and the great power system that has returned from a brief hiatus during the unipolar moment, is both novel and persuasive. In his new book, The Return of the Great Powers, Simms provides an exquisite, sober rendering of more than five centuries of geopolitical history. He also constructs a framework through which one can define and make sense of the great powers, eschewing “realism” and the more obvious measurements of geopolitical power for a more sophisticated approach.
In order to gauge the status of a great power, Simms argues, we must consider “the global distribution of resources, reach, reputation, and resilience.” “Resources” includes whether or not a country has the dynamism and military capacity to protect itself or to bend others to its will (e.g., nuclear weapons, natural resources, favorable demographics, a strong economy). “Reach” entails whether or not said country can project power and influence beyond its own region and penetrate such difficult domains as space and cyberspace. The third criterion of “reputation” measures how a country is perceived by others and, perhaps more importantly, how it views itself and its mission. And “resilience” considers how hard of a beating — economically, militarily, or otherwise — a country can absorb.
The international system is directly linked with the rise of the West, approximately half a millennium ago. Simms goes back to the disintegration of two distinct global “ordering systems”: the Roman Empire (in Europe, North Africa, and the Middle East) and the Mongol Empire (which spanned the Eurasian heartland and included modern-day Russia, China, and Iran). Simms traces the origins of the modern great power system to the unique conditions of 15th-century Europe, where competition among states was both constant and fierce. He argues that today, the great powers remain the driving force of geopolitics.
Starting in Europe, over the centuries a series of stabilizing coalitions were formed between such powers, aimed to keep order in an otherwise chaotic international arena: the Treaty of Westphalia, which guaranteed the stability of the Holy Roman Empire through a great power pact; the “pentarchy” of the 18th century; the “Concert of Europe,” inaugurated by the 1814-15 Vienna Settlement; the short-lived Council of the League of Nations (whose four permanent members were Britain, France, Italy, and Japan); the victorious “grand alliance,” or “big three” coalition, of World War II; and the five permanent members of the U.N. Security Council, which persists to this day, albeit with Russia standing in for the collapsed Soviet Union, and Beijing superseding Taipei in 1971.
Controversially, Simms asserts that Britain, along with Russia, China, and the U.S., counts among today’s exclusive quartet of great powers. France, India, Japan, Germany, and the European Union do not make the cut and are instead classified as “almost great,” with each assigned a brisk though deeply instructive history. Certain questions do arise. Why Britain, and not France, which Simms concedes to be a more nuanced case? After all, the latter’s nuclear deterrent is fully sovereign, unlike the former, reliant as it is on imported American missiles.
Simms argues the United Kingdom’s formidable though declining global reach and large network of overseas bases, from Cyprus to the Falklands, are still enough to defend its claim to great power status. The Royal Navy, while a shadow of what it was just a generation ago, still sports nuclear submarines and two modern aircraft carriers that are sufficient, he claims, to make “a substantial difference to the maritime balance of power.” Simms does concede that, partly due to Britain’s domestic political woes — a country more “diverse and divided” than ever — its great power status “is by no means secure.”
Another controversial addition to the pantheon of great powers is Russia, now bogged down by four years of war in Ukraine, isolated by sanctions, and facing increasing pressure from China. But since Russia is largely autarchic — apart from its reliance on imports of advanced technology and pharmaceuticals, a gap which Simms warrants it could close — it is certainly resilient. It is completely self-reliant in energy and foodstuffs, a trait it shares with no other power but the U.S. Meanwhile, its military resources remain preeminent: The Russian nuclear arsenal, which exceeds all others, is capable of destroying the U.S. in 30 minutes, and, with its robust second-strike capabilities, could do so even if attacked first.
Simms, whose tone remains neutral, rational, and measured throughout, notes that President Vladimir Putin’s view of Russian power is “not a bid for world domination, but a claim to be exempted from being dominated by the global hegemon, the United States.” While there are tail winds that could strengthen Russia’s hand in the years ahead, such as the growing strategic importance of the Arctic, Simms concludes “the omens are not good” for the future of Russia’s great power status.
Simms’s assessment of China, and of Sino-American competition, is especially noteworthy: “In retrospect, the years 2017 and 2018 appear to be the moment of ‘Peak China.’” Economically and demographically slowed, the future of the People’s Republic of China will ultimately hinge on the fate of Taiwan, he argues, after which, contingent upon the outcome of such a confrontation, China could either rise to global hegemony or lose its great power status altogether. Battered by the COVID-19 pandemic and domestic political upheavals, the U.S., on the other hand, has since surged ahead of its economic challengers, China and the EU, largely thanks to its dominance in tech, while Russia’s war in Ukraine remains a bloody, expensive stalemate. Despite stumbling slightly at the beginning of the decade, American power remains unmatched (though it is worth noting that Simms completed this book before this year’s events in Venezuela and Iran).
The Return of the Great Powers is a work of exceptional quality and has the makings of a seminal text. The foreign ministries and military academies of the world would do well in assigning it to their officers and diplomats. But despite its erudition, it still manages to be remarkably accessible. Simms’s conclusions, though, are ultimately worrying. It seems likely that the future will be rife with competition, decline, and, perhaps, a fundamental reordering of the U.S.’s relationship with the world. Among the few certainties is that the era of great power competition has resumed, however brief the intermezzo, and the decisions made in the coming years will determine which powers endure and which enter the margins of history.
Carson Becker is an American writer.
